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Abstract
The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent
studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper
focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture
the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic
framework: primeval games. These games are used to design normative compensation rules
for the underlying compensation problems: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and
the primeval rule. Characterizations of the marginalistic rule and the concession rule are
provided and specific properties of the primeval rule are studied.
JEL classification codes: C71; D62; D63.
Keywords: externality; compensation; primeval games; marginalistic rule; concession
rule; primeval rule.
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the issue of externality and the associated compensation problem.
Externalities arise whenever an (economic) agent undertakes an action that has an effect
on another agent. When the effect turns out to be a cost imposed on the other agent(s),
it is called a negative externality. When agents benefit from an activity in which they
are not directly involved, the effect is called a positive externality. An associated funda-
mental question in real life is how to compensate for the losses incurred by the negative
externalities.
Pigou (1920) suggests a solution that involves intervention by a regulator who imposes
a (Pigouvian) tax. An alternative solution, known as the Coase theorem (Coase (1960)),
involves negotiation between the agents. Coase claims that if transactions costs are zero
and property rights are well defined, agents should be able to negotiate their way to an
efficient outcome. A third class of solutions, associated with Arrow (1970), involves setting
up a market for the externality. If a firm produces pollution that harms another firm, then
a competitive market for the right to pollute may allow for an efficient outcome. In this
framework, Varian (1994) designs the so-called compensation mechanisms for internalizing
externalities which encourage the firms to correctly reveal the costs they impose on the
other.
In fact, all solutions and approaches above try and solve the inefficiency problems aris-
ing from externalities, whereas they cannot be viewed as normative answers in terms of
fairness. In particular, the theories cannot answer a basic question like how much a house-
hold should be compensated by a polluting firm. Therefore, we are still in search of basic
normative solutions which might serve as benchmarks to determine adequate compensa-
tions in environments that are featured by externalities.
Solving an externality-incurred compensation problem boils down to recommending
rules or solutions for profit/cost sharing problems with externalities. A first model to solve
this problem was developed by Thrall and Lucas (1963) by the concept of partition function
form games : a partition function assigns a value to each pair consisting of a coalition and
a coalition structure which includes that coalition. Solution concepts for such games can
be found in Myerson (1977), Bolger (1989), Feldman (1994), Potter (2000), Pham Do and
Norde (2002), Maskin (2003), Macho-Stadler, Pe´rez-Castrillo, and Wettstein (2004), and
Ju (2004a).
However, one may observe that the framework of partition function form games does not
model the externalities among individuals but is restricted to specific coalitional effects.
The reason is simple: Partition function form games as well as cooperative games with
transferable utility (TU games) in characteristic function form always assume all the players
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in the player set N are present even if they do not form a coalition. Consider a partition
function form game and a player i in this game. What we know about the values with
respect to i covers the following three cases only: complete breakdown, i.e. all the players
in this game do not cooperate with each other; partial cooperation, i.e. i participates in
some coalition or i stands alone while some other players cooperate; complete cooperation,
i.e. all the players form a grand coalition. In fact, the externalities among individual
players (inter-individual externalities) are “internalized” or “incorporated” from the very
beginning because there is no explicit distinction between the case when only one player
is in the game and the case when all appear.
The task attempted in this paper is essentially twofold. First, it takes a player’s initial
situation (no other players, in an absolute stand-alone sense) into account and constructs
a new class of games, primeval games, which model the externalities among individual
players. Second, it discusses several compensation rules which can actually serve as specific
benchmarks to solve the compensation issue related to externality problems.
Primeval games have a flavor of TU games and are like partition function form games
in structure. Two basic differences with respect to the classical cooperative games are
that primeval games do not consider cooperation (and, hence, the notion of a coalition is
avoided), and primeval games take into account all situations in which only a subgroup of
players is present. In this way, all possible externalities among players are modelled.
We introduce three compensation rules for primeval games: the marginalistic rule, a
modification of the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley (1953)), the concession rule, which
is in the same spirit as the consensus value for TU games (Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007)),
and a more context-specific compensation rule, the primeval rule. The first two solution
concepts are axiomatically characterized. Properties of the primeval rule are discussed.
The paper has the following structure. The next section presents a small example that
motivates the approach and the model. In section 3, we lay out the general model: primeval
games. Section 4 defines three solution concepts for primeval games. Section 5 discusses
possible properties of a compensation rule for primeval games, and then characterizes the
marginalistic rule and the concession rule. Moreover, specific properties of the primeval
rule are studied and a comparison with the marginalistic rule and the concession rule is
provided for specific types of players in the same section. The final section concludes the
paper.
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2 A motivating example
Consider a scenario with three (economic) agents, a (a firm that generates air pollution),
b (a flower farm), and c (a swimming pool), negotiating to settle in an area close to one
another. Based on social welfare considerations, the local municipality is trying to reach
mutual agreement to accommodate all agents.
If all three agents would settle down together, the air pollution of agent a would neg-
atively affect both the blossoming results of agent b and the number of visitors of the
swimming pool. Moreover, the attraction of insects by the flowers of b and the smell of
fertilizer would have negative externality on c. Meanwhile, the swimming pool would also
cause negative effects on b by visitors’ cars and unwanted garbage deposits. Suppose in
this case (i.e., three agents co-existing) the utilities of a, b, and c are given by 12, 4 and
−1, respectively.
In order to more clearly pinpoint the externalities and to further understand the precise
consequences, it is necessary and interesting to go “back” to see the “primeval” situations:
to describe the six possibilities which can serve as reference points in the negotiations.
Utilities fitting the story adequately are given in the table below. For instance, in the case
that only agent b operates in the area while both a and c do not settle there, b’s utility
would be 8, which corresponds to the second column of the table.
(a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
(12) (8) (6) (12, 5) (12, 2) (7, 3) (12, 4,−1)
Here, from the externality point of view one can readily detect a basis for conflicts. In
particular, without adequate compensation, c can anticipate the fact of negative profits
caused by the presence of both a and b. In this case c will not set up business at all, which
is not a desirable outcome in terms of social welfare. Also b might turn to the municipality
for compensation for the negative effects caused by a and c. The questions are: Should
c as well as b be compensated? If so, by whom and how much? And in a more general
interactive environment, how to solve the conflicts arising from the externalities among
individual agents?
The situation could be further complicated by the presence of a fourth agent, d, rep-
resenting a cafeteria. In this case also positive externalities could be generated by d on c,
and vice versa. Then externalities have a mixed or combined character and the resulting
compensation issue becomes less transparent. Therefore, the need for a formal consistent
analysis and the search for reasonable compensation rules become more prominent.
Note that apparently one can come up with different (economic) stories or alternative
interpretations to the above table. However, the nature remains: individual agents may
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generate externalities to the others. We therefore will construct a general model to capture
this class of externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue.
3 The model: primeval games
To capture all the possibilities of the so-called inter-individual externalities and further dis-
cuss the associated compensation problem, we now construct the formal model of primeval
games.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the finite set of players. A subset S of N , in order to be
distinguished from the usual concept of coalition in cooperative games, is called a group
of individuals (in short, a group S). Here, the term of group should be understood as a
neutral concept, which has nothing to do with cooperation or anything else, but simply
means a set of individual players in N .
A pair (i, S) that consists of a player i and a group S of N to which i belongs is called
an embedded player in S. Let E(N) denote the set of embedded players, i.e.
E(N) = {(i, S) ∈ N × 2N |i ∈ S} .
Definition 3.1 A mapping
u : E(N) −→ R
that assigns a real value u(i, S) to each embedded player (i, S) is an individual-group func-
tion. The ordered pair (N, u) is called a primeval game1. The set of primeval games with
player set N is denoted by PRIN .
The value u(i, S) represents the payoff, or utility, of player i, given that all players in
S are present while all players in N\S are absent. For a given group S and an individual-
group function u, let u¯(S) denote the vector (u(i, S))i∈S. We call u(i, {i}) the absolute
stand-alone payoff, or the Robinson Crusoe payoff (in short, R-C payoff) of player i in
game u.
We want to stress, however, that the model of primeval games does not consider the
phenomenon of cooperation and, hence, the individual numbers with respect to subgroups
are not the result of internal negotiations among the players involved: they just model the
consequences of individual externalities due to the presence of others.
Furthermore, the model of primeval games assumes that the player set is exogenously
given and no player can exclude another. However, the fact that a player has the right
1Since a primeval game models inter-individual externalities and aims to solve the associated compen-
sation problem, an alternative name would be individual externality-compensation game.
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to be in a game does not necessarily mean that he or she has the right to affect another
player. Therefore, when confronted with externalities, making monetary transfers among
players by a reasonable compensation rule that satisfies a set of normative standards may
help to smooth out the corresponding conflicts.
Definition 3.2 A (compensation) rule on PRIN is a function f , which associates with
each primeval game (N, u) in PRIN a vector f(N, u) = (fi(N, u))i∈N ∈ RN of individual
payoffs.
Efficiency of a compensation rule f will require that
∑
i∈N fi(N, u) =
∑
i∈N u(i, N).
That is to say, the situation in question is the case that all players co-exist. The prime
question is whether the corresponding payoff vector (u(i, N))i∈N , representing individual
payoffs resulting from externalities while no compensation is involved yet, is a fair status or
not. The primeval situations in the model, i.e., all possible co-existences of subsets of the
players, are used to examine the source and magnitude of the corresponding inter-individual
externalities. A compensation rule describes the transfers among the co-existing players
to fairly take externalities into consideration. Since we aim to smooth out the conflicts
arising from externalities, ideally, a compensation rule should be designed in accordance
with well justified principles or generally accepted conventions in this context and take all
these primeval situations into account.
4 Compensation rules
This section introduces several compensation rules for primeval games. Since it is assumed
that for any primeval game every player has the same right to enter it, there is no prede-
termined ordering of players. However, we need to take orders into account because they
help to clarify the relationship among players with respect to externalities. Therefore, we
consider all different orderings of players when determining compensations in the context
of externalities.
4.1 The marginalistic rule
People generally believe that one should not do harm to the others, and otherwise, one
must provide compensation. Analogously, if a player’s activities impose a positive effect
on the others, then he has the right to ask them to pay for that. Meanwhile we might
adopt a practical principle known as first come, first served. That is, the player who comes
into a game first should be well protected: Any later entrant must compensate him if she
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causes loss on him while he need not worry about any possible negative effects he could
impose on the later entrants, i.e., he has the right to assume no responsibility for his
behavior, irrespective of what consequence it might cause on the others. Along the same
line of reasoning, the second entrant only cares about the first player but does not have any
responsibility for his successors whereas all his successors should take care of the first two
entrants’ payoffs. More specifically, given an ordering of players, the early entrants should
be well protected such that the losses due to negative externalities that possibly arise later
are compensated. Also, the gains from positive externalities should be transferred to whom
they are produced by. Those effects can be well captured by the so-called marginal values.
Thus, the corresponding rule is in fact a completely marginal treatment of externalities.
The formal definition is provided as follows. For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , let
Π(N) be the set of all bijections σ : {1, ..., |N |} −→ N . For a given σ ∈ Π(N) and
k ∈ {1, ..., |N |} we define Sσk = {σ(1), ..., σ(k)} and Sσ0 = ∅. We construct the marginal
vector mσ(u), which corresponds to the situation where the players enter the game one by
one in the order σ(1), ..., σ(|N |) and where each player σ(k) is given the marginal value he
creates by entering. Formally, it is the vector in RN defined by
mσσ(k)(u) =
{
u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) if k = 1
u(σ(k), Sσk ) +
∑k−1
j=1
(
u(σ(j), Sσk )− u(σ(j), Sσk−1)
)
if k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}.
Therefore, player σ(k) might be involved in four kinds of compensating behavior or circum-
stances: compensating the incumbents if he produces negative externalities on them, being
compensated from the incumbents if they benefit from his showing up (i.e., he produces
positive externalities on the incumbents), being compensated by the later entrants if they
impose negative externalities on him; paying compensation to the later entrants if they
generate positive externalities on him.
Here, one can readily check that for a primeval game u ∈ PRIN and an order σ ∈ Π(N),
t∑
k=1
mσσ(k)(u) =
t∑
k=1
u(σ(k), Sσt )
for all t ∈ {1, ..., |N |}.
Furthermore, since no predetermined ordering of players exists, we take all possible
permutations into consideration. Thus, themarginalistic rule Φ(u) is defined as the average
of the marginal vectors, i.e.,
Φ(u) =
1
|N |!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
mσ(u).
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Note that the marginalitic rule for primeval games is in the same spirit of the Shapley
value for TU games.2 But the above story explains the nature of compensations in the
context of inter-individual externalities and contrasts with the other compensation rules
introduced below.
Example 4.1 Consider the following primeval game u with three players, a, b and c, which
involves both positive externalities and negative externalities.
S (a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
u¯(S) (5) (3) (2) (8, 2) (5, 1) (3, 0) (8, 2, 2)
The outcome of the marginalistic rule is given by Φ(u) =
(
61
2
, 4, 11
2
)
. Thus, to compensate
for externalities, a needs to pay 11
2
to b, and c will pay 1
2
to b.
4.2 The concession rule
One might oppose the “first come, first served” idea behind the marginal vectors underly-
ing the marginalistic rule and rather prefer an equal responsibility based rule: From the
bilateral point of view, both parties (the incumbents and the entrant) should be equally
responsible for an externality due to the showing up of the new entrant.
Formally, in order to define the concession rule for primeval games, we construct the
concession vector Cσ(u), which corresponds to the situation where players enter the game
u one by one in an order σ ∈ Π(N) and where every new entrant, say σ(k), first obtains
the payoff when entering, u(σ(k), Sσk ), and then equally shares with every incumbent her
surplus/loss incurred by the corresponding positive/negative externality imposed by him,
and also equally shares his surplus/loss with all his successors. The notion of concession is
introduced here because players concede to each other and make a compromise on assuming
responsibilities of the externalities.
We first define player σ(k)’s concession payoff for the externalities on previous players
as
Pσσ(k)(u) =
k−1∑
j=1
u(σ(j), Sσk )− u(σ(j), Sσk−1)
2
and his concession payoff from the subsequent externalities as
Sσσ(k)(u) =
|N |∑
l=k+1
u(σ(k), Sσl )− u(σ(k), Sσl−1)
2
.
2More specifically, for any u ∈ PRIN , one can obtain a regular TU game v defined by v(S) =∑
i∈S u(i, S) for all S ⊂ N . It can be readily shown that the Shapley value of the TU game v coin-
cides with the outcome of the marginalistic rule of the primeval game u. However, there are no direct
counterparts in TU games for the next two compensation rules for primeval games.
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Apparently, when a player enters the game u in the very first place, he has no concession
payoff for the externalities on previous players. Therefore Pσσ(1)(u) = 0. Correspondingly,
when a player enters a game in the very last place, there is no subsequent externality for
him. Hence, Sσσ(|N |)(u) = 0.
Moreover, the concession payoff from the subsequent externalities for player σ(k) can
be simplified as
Sσσ(k)(u) =
u(σ(k), N)− u(σ(k), Sσk )
2
for all k = {1, ..., |N | − 1}.
Now, formally, the concession vector is the vector in RN defined by
Cσσ(k)(u) =

u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) + Sσσ(1)(u) if k = 1
u(σ(k), Sσk ) + Pσσ(k)(u) + Sσσ(k)(u) if k = {2, ..., |N | − 1}
u(σ(|N |), N) + Pσσ(|N |)(u) if k = |N |.
And more explicitly,
Cσσ(k)(u) =

u(σ(1),N)+u(σ(1),{σ(1)})
2
if k = 1
Pσσ(k)(u) + u(σ(k),N)+u(σ(k),S
σ
k )
2
if k = {2, ..., |N | − 1}
u(σ(|N |), N) + Pσσ(|N |)(u) if k = |N |.
We want to note that for a primeval game u ∈ PRIN and an order σ ∈ Π(N),
|N |∑
k=1
Cσσ(k)(u) =
|N |∑
k=1
u(σ(k), N),
but generally,
t∑
k=1
Cσσ(k)(u) 6=
t∑
k=1
u(σ(k), Sσt )
for t ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1}.
The concession rule C(u) is defined as the average of the concession vectors, i.e.,
C(u) = 1|N |!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
Cσ(u).
Note that the concession rule for primeval games is in the same spirit as the consensus
value for TU games (cf. Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007)).
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Example 4.2 Consider the primeval game of Example 4.1. All concession vectors are
given by
σ Cσa (u) C
σ
b (u) C
σ
c (u)
(a b c) 61
2
31
2
2
(a c b) 61
2
4 11
2
(b a c) 71
2
21
2
2
(b c a) 81
2
21
2
1
(c a b) 6 4 2
(c b a) 81
2
11
2
2
Then, we get C(u) = (71
4
, 3, 13
4
)
. Thus, to compensate for externalities, a needs to pay 3
4
to b, and c will pay 1
4
to b. Compared to the outcome of the marginalistic rule, both a and
c give less compensation to b.
Proposition 4.3 describes a direct relation between the concession rule and the marginal-
istic rule.
Proposition 4.3 The outcome prescribed by the concession rule turns out to be the average
of the status quo payoff vector and the outcome of the marginalitic rule. For any game
u ∈ PRIN , we have
Ci(u) = 1
2
u(i, N) +
1
2
Φi(u)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof.
It can be readily shown that for all σ ∈ Π(N) and k ∈ {1, ...|N |}
Cσσ(k)(u) =
1
2
u(i, N) +
1
2
mσσ(k)(u).
From this the result is obvious.
4.3 The primeval rule
We now propose an alternative rule, the basic idea of which is that the losses due to negative
externalities should be compensated whereas the benefits from the positive externalities
are enjoyed for free. This is a general and natural attitude when people face externalities
in reality. Thus, the rule based on this idea might be easily accepted and implemented in
practice.
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The corresponding rule could be described as the chargeable negative externalities and
free positive externalities rule. For shorthand we call it the primeval rule.
For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN and an ordering σ ∈ Π(N) and k ∈ {1, ..., |N |},
we construct the primeval vector Bσ(u), which corresponds to the situation where the
players enter the game one by one in the order σ(1), ..., σ(|N |) and where each player
σ(k) compensates the losses of his predecessors but enjoys positive externalities from his
successors freely.
We now define player σ(k)’s loss for compensating negative externalities as
Lσσ(k)(u) =
k−1∑
j=1
max
{
u(σ(j), Sσk−1)− u(σ(j), Sσk ), 0
}
and his gain from subsequent positive externalities as
Gσσ(k)(u) =
|N |∑
l=k+1
max
{
u(σ(k), Sσl )− u(σ(k), Sσl−1), 0
}
.
Apparently, when a player enters the game u in the very first place, he assumes no
responsibility for the others. Therefore, Lσσ(1)(u) = 0. Similarly, when a player enters a
game in the very last place, he cannot enjoy any subsequent positive externalities. Hence,
Gσσ(|N |)(u) = 0.
Formally, the primeval vector Bσ(u) is the vector in RN defined by
Bσσ(k)(u) =

u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) +Gσσ(1)(u) if k = 1
u(σ(k), Sσk )− Lσσ(k)(u) +Gσσ(k)(u) if k ∈ {2, ..., |N | − 1}
u(σ(|N |), N)− Lσσ(|N |)(u) if k = |N |.
Similar to the concession rule, here one can check that for a primeval game u ∈ PRIN and
an order σ ∈ Π(N),
|N |∑
k=1
Bσσ(k)(u) =
|N |∑
k=1
u(σ(k), N),
but generally,
t∑
k=1
Bσσ(k)(u) 6=
t∑
k=1
u(σ(k), Sσt )
for t ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1}.
The primeval rule ζ(u) is defined as the average of the primeval vectors, i.e.,
ζ(u) =
1
|N |!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
Bσ(u).
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Example 4.4 Consider the primeval game of Example 4.1. All primeval vectors are given
by
σ Bσa (u) B
σ
b (u) B
σ
c (u)
(a b c) 8 2 2
(a c b) 8 2 2
(b a c) 7 3 2
(b c a) 7 3 2
(c a b) 7 2 3
(c b a) 7 1 4
Then, we get ζ(u) =
(
71
3
, 21
6
, 21
2
)
. Thus, to compensate for externalities, a needs to pay 1
6
to b and 1
2
to c. Note that in this case c even becomes a compensation receiver instead of
a provider like in the previous two cases. This is due to the underlying idea that positive
externalities are for free.
We want to note that in general there is no direct relation between the primeval rule
and the other two compensations rules. However, when we focus on the class of negative
externality primeval games, we can find that the outcome prescribed by the primeval
rule coincides with the outcome of the marginalistic rule, as described by the following
proposition. A primeval game (N, u) is called a negative externality primeval game if
u(i, T ) ≥ u(i, S) for all i ∈ T and all T ⊂ S ⊂ N . This is a situation in which the presence
of any extra player will not make any player including herself better off. The example
discussed in section 2 is a negative externality primeval game.
Proposition 4.5 For any negative externality primeval game u ∈ PRIN , we have
Φi(u) = ζi(u)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof.
Let (N, u) be a negative externality primeval game. Given σ ∈ Π(N) and i ∈ N . Let
i = σ(k). It suffices to show Bσi (u) = m
σ
i (u). Since (N, u) is a negative externality
primeval game, player i’s gain from subsequent positive externalities is always zero, i.e.,
Gσi (u) = G
σ
σ(k)(u) = 0 for all k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. Moreover, player i’s loss for compensating
negative externalities is
Lσi (u) = L
σ
σ(k)(u) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
u(σ(j), Sσk−1)− u(σ(j), Sσk )
)
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for all k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}. By the definition of the primeval vector, we then have
Bσi (u) = B
σ
σ(k)(u) =
{
u(i, {i}) if k = 1
u(i, Sσk )−
∑k−1
j=1
(
u(σ(j), Sσk−1)− u(σ(j), Sσk )
)
if k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}
which equals mσi (u).
Hence, the outcomes prescribed by the three compensation rules for the example dis-
cussed in section 2 are given by Φ(u) = ζ(u) = (82
3
, 42
3
, 12
3
) and C(u) = (101
3
, 41
3
, 1
3
).
Analogously, a primeval game (N, u) is called a positive externality primeval game if
u(i, T ) ≤ u(i, S) for all i ∈ T and all T ⊂ S ⊂ N . Apparently, for any positive externality
primeval game (N, u), ζi(u) = u(i, N) for all i ∈ N . Following Proposition 4.3, we know
Corollary 4.6 For any positive externality primeval game u ∈ PRIN , we have3
Ci(u) = 1
2
Φi(u) +
1
2
ζi(u)
for all i ∈ N .
5 Properties and characterizations
This section discusses possible properties of a compensation rule for primeval games. We
then provide characterizations using those properties.
The first property introduced below focuses on the externality side of a primeval game
and, consequently, fits the context well.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called an immune player if u(i, S) = u(i, {i})
for all S ⊂ N and i ∈ S. Thus, an immune player is a player who is not affected by the
presence of the others.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called an uninfluential player if u(j, S ∪
{i}) = u(j, S) for all S ⊂ N\{i} and j ∈ S. Thus, an uninfluential player is a player who
never affects another player.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called a neutral player if it is both an
immune player and an uninfluential player in (N, u).
• Property 1 (The neutral player property): fi(u) = u(i, {i}), for all u ∈ PRIN and for
any neutral player i in (N, u).
3Please note that this result cannot be extended because the primeval rule does not satisfy additivity,
as suggested by Example 5.7 in section 5.
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It is reasonable to require a compensation rule for primeval games to satisfy the neutral
player property. Hence, it can serve as a basic benchmark to judge if a compensation rule
is adequately sensible. While one can easily come up with a rule that fails to satisfy this
property, we find that the marginalistic rule, the concession rule and the primeval rule pass
the test.
Proposition 5.1 The marginalistic rule, the concession rule and the primeval rule satisfy
the neutral player property.
Proof.
It follows that if player i is a neutral player in (N, u), then for the marginalistic rule
mσi (u) = u(i, {i}) for any σ ∈ Π(N); for the concession rule Cσi (u) = u(i, {i}) for any
σ ∈ Π(N); and for the primeval rule Bσi (u) = u(i, {i}) for any σ ∈ Π(N).
We now turn to other possible properties. As the co-existence of all players of a primeval
game is the situation in question, we require the efficiency (or balanced-budget) property
for a compensation rule: the sum of all the players’ values according to the rule equals the
sum of their status quo payoffs.
• Property 2 (Efficiency): ∑i∈N fi(u) =∑i∈N u(i, N) for all u ∈ PRIN .
A third property is symmetry. For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , we say that two players
i, j ∈ N are symmetric if for all S ⊂ N\{i, j},
u(i, S ∪ {i}) +
∑
k∈S
u(k, S ∪ {i}) = u(j, S ∪ {j}) +
∑
k∈S
u(k, S ∪ {j}).
It implies that in terms of total payoffs, the showing up of i has the same effect as that of
j for any group of players without i and j.
• Property 3 (Symmetry): fi(u) = fj(u) for all u ∈ PRIN , and for all symmetric
players i, j in (N, u).
The next property is the dummy property. Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is
called a dummy if∑
j∈S
u(j, S ∪ {i}) + u(i, S ∪ {i}) =
∑
j∈S
u(j, S) + u(i, {i})
for all S ⊂ N\{i}.
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• Property 4 (The dummy property): fi(u) = u(i, {i}), for all u ∈ PRIN and for any
dummy player i in (N, u).
We now introduce the following property.
• Property 5 (Additivity): f(u1 + u2) = f(u1) + f(u2) for all u1, u2 ∈ PRIN , where
u1 + u2 is defined by (u1 + u2)(i, S) = u1(i, S) + u2(i, S) for every (i, S) ∈ E(N).
Theorem 5.2 There is a unique compensation rule on PRIN satisfying efficiency, sym-
metry, the dummy property and additivity. This rule is the marginalistic rule.
The proof follows the lines of the proof of the characterization of the Shapley value for
TU games: the unanimity primeval games as provided below take the role of the unanimity
TU games. An explicit proof along similar lines is provided for the concession rule in the
proof of Theorem 5.5.
As a generalization of unanimity games for the class of TU games, unanimity games
for primeval games can be defined as follows.
Definition 5.3 Let (j, T ) ∈ E(N) be an embedded player. The unanimity game w(j,T ),
corresponding to (j, T ), is given by
w(j,T )(i, S) =
{
1, if j = i and T ⊂ S
0, otherwise
for every (i, S) ∈ E(N).
One can prove, similar to the case of TU games, that the unanimity games form a basis
for the class of primeval games (cf. Ju (2004b, p.100-101, Lemma 5.5.3)). This means
that if (N, u) is a primeval game, then there exist uniquely determined real numbers d(j,T ),
(j, T ) ∈ E(N), such that u =∑(j,T )∈E(N) d(j,T )w(j,T ).
As the following example shows, the concession rule and the primeval rule satisfy neither
symmetry nor the dummy property.
Example 5.4 Consider the following two primeval games (N, u1) and (N, u2) with N =
{a, b, c} such that a and b are symmetric players in game u1 and c is a dummy in game u2.
S (a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
u¯1(S) (1) (1) (5) (2, 3) (2, 4) (0, 6) (3, 4, 2)
u¯2(S) (5) (3) (2) (8, 2) (3, 4) (4, 1) (6, 0, 6)
However, the solutions for these two games are: Φ(u1) = (2
1
6
, 21
6
, 42
3
); C(u1) = (2 712 , 3 112 , 313);
ζ(u1) = (1
1
2
, 31
2
, 4) and Φ(u2) = (6, 4, 2); C(u2) = (6, 2, 4); ζ(u2) = (512 , 2, 412).
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Consider the dummy property which takes a marginal contribution perspective and
assigns a dummy player his R-C payoff. As we know, without taking compensation into
account, a dummy player i would get u(i, N). As u(i, {i}) and u(i, N) represent two polar
opinions, one may argue that taking the average could be a fair compromise.
• Property 6 (The quasi dummy property): fi(u) = u(i,{i})+u(i,N)2 , for all u ∈ PRIN and
for any dummy player i in (N, u).
Now we introduce the property of adjusted symmetry. Similar to the quasi dummy
property, one may have the following argument. On the one hand, when considering the
same effect on total payoffs that symmetric players have, they may require the same value
in a game. On the other hand, since symmetric players can have different R-C payoffs or
status quo payoffs, their values should reflect such differences. An immediate and easy way
to deal with this problem is to adjust the values by their status quo payoffs.
• Property 7 (Adjusted symmetry): There is an α(u) ∈ R such that
fi(u) =
α(u) + u(i, N)
2
and fj(u) =
α(u) + u(j,N)
2
for all u ∈ PRIN , and for all symmetric players i, j in u, where α(u) is called the
standard value for symmetric players in u.
Theorem 5.5 The concession rule is the unique compensation rule on PRIN satisfying
efficiency, adjusted symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.
Proof.
By the definition of the concession rule, efficiency and additivity are straightforward to
check.
Now we show that the concession rule satisfies the quasi dummy property. Given a game
u ∈ PRIN and σ ∈ Π(N), let player i be a dummy player in u and i = σ(k). By definition,
it can be readily verified that for all k ∈ {2, ..., |N |},
Pσσ(k)(u) =
1
2
k−1∑
j=1
(
u(σ(j), Sσk )− u(σ(j), Sσk−1)
)
=
1
2
(u(i, {i})− u(i, Sσk )) .
Then, by the definition of the concession vector, we know
Cσσ(k)(u) =
u(i, {i}) + u(i, N)
2
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for all k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. What remains is obvious.
Below we show that the concession rule satisfies adjusted symmetry. Let i1, i2 be two
symmetric players in u ∈ PRIN . Consider σ ∈ Π(N), and without loss of generality,
σ(k) = i1, σ(h) = i2, where i1, i2 ∈ N . Let σ¯ ∈ Π(N) be the permutation which is
obtained from σ by interchanging the positions of i1 and i2, i.e.
σ¯(w) =

σ(w) if w 6= k, h
i1 if w = h
i2 if w = k.
As σ 7→ σ¯ is bijective, it suffices to prove that there exists an ασ(u) ∈ R such that
Cσi1(u) =
ασ(u)+u(i1,N)
2
and C σ¯i2(u) =
ασ(u)+u(i2,N)
2
.
Case 1: 1 < k < h.
By definition, we know that
Cσi1(u) = C
σ
σ(k)(u) =
1
2
(
k∑
l=1
u(σ(l), Sσk )−
k−1∑
j=1
u(σ(j), Sσk−1) + u(σ(k), N)
)
C σ¯i2(u) = C
σ¯
σ¯(k)(u) =
1
2
(
k∑
l=1
u(σ¯(l), Sσ¯k )−
k−1∑
j=1
u(σ¯(j), Sσ¯k−1) + u(σ¯(k), N)
)
.
Obviously, u(σ(j), Sσk−1) = u(σ¯(j), S
σ¯
k−1) for all j ∈ {1, ..., k− 1}. Moreover, since i1 and i2
are symmetric players,
∑k
l=1 u(σ(l), S
σ
k ) =
∑k
l=1 u(σ¯(l), S
σ¯
k ). Let α
σ(u) =:
∑k
l=1 u(σ(l), S
σ
k )−∑k−1
j=1 u(σ(j), S
σ
k−1). We then have C
σ
i1
(u) = α
σ(u)+u(i1,N)
2
and C σ¯i2(u) =
ασ(u)+u(i2,N)
2
.
Case 2: 1 < h < k. The proof is analogous to the above.
Case 3: 1 = k < h. This is obvious because
Cσi1(u) = C
σ
σ(1)(u) =
u(i1, {i1}) + u(i1, N)
2
C σ¯i2(u) = C
σ¯
σ¯(1)(u) =
u(i2, {i2}) + u(i2, N)
2
,
and u(i1, {i1}) = u(i2, {i2}).
Case 4: 1 = h < k. Analogously, the proof is easy to be established.
As a consequence, the concession rule satisfies adjusted symmetry.
Conversely, suppose a compensation rule f satisfies these four properties. We have to show
that f = C. Let u be a primeval game on N . Then,
u =
∑
(j,T )∈E(N)
d(j,T )w(j,T )
16
where d(j,T ) is uniquely determined.
By the additivity property,
f(u) =
∑
(j,T )∈E(N)
f(d(j,T )w(j,T )) and C(u) =
∑
(j,T )∈E(N)
C(d(j,T )w(j,T )).
Thus, it suffices to show that for all (j, T ) ∈ E(N) and d(j,T ) ∈ R we have f(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
C(d(j,T )w(j,T )).
Let (j, T ) ∈ E(N) and d(j,T ) ∈ R. For any i /∈ T , one readily verifies that i is a dummy
player of game (N, d(j,T )w(j,T )). Therefore, by the quasi dummy property,
fi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = Ci(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = 0 for all i /∈ T. (1)
Moreover, we know that all players in group T are symmetric players in (N, d(j,T )w(j,T )).
By adjusted symmetry,
fi(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
αf
2
for all i ∈ T\{j} and some αf ∈ R, (2)
and
Ci(d(j,T )w(j,T )) = αC
2
for all i ∈ T\{j} and some αC ∈ R. (3)
And for player j, by adjusted symmetry as well, we have
fj(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
αf + d(j,T )
2
and Cj(d(j,T )w(j,T )) =
αC + d(j,T )
2
. (4)
Therefore, efficiency and (1)-(4) imply that
αf = αC =
1
|T |d(j,T ).
Finally, we note that the four properties characterizing the concession rule are logically
independent.
Before introducing the next property, we first define completely symmetric players.
Given a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , we say that two players i, j ∈ N are completely
symmetric if for all S ⊂ N\{i, j},
u(i, S ∪ {i}) = u(j, S ∪ {j}) and u(i, S ∪ {j} ∪ {i}) = u(j, S ∪ {j} ∪ {i})
and for all k ∈ S
u(k, S ∪ {i}) = u(k, S ∪ {j}).
It is natural to require that two completely symmetric players get the same value in
a primeval game as their emergences generate the same influence on other players while
getting the same influence from the emergences of the others.
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• Property 8 (Complete symmetry): fi(u) = fj(u) for all u ∈ PRIN , and for all
completely symmetric players i, j ∈ N .
Obviously, from the stronger versions of symmetry considered before, it readily follows
that both the marginalisitic rule and the concession rule satisfy complete symmetry.
Now we discuss another property which pays more attention to the compensation aspect
and therefore seems important in the context of primeval games.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called a harmful player if u(j, S ∪ {i}) ≤
u(j, S) for all S ⊂ N\{i} and j ∈ S. Thus, a harmful player is a player who never generates
positive externalities to other players.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called a harmless player if u(j, S ∪ {i}) ≥
u(j, S) for all S ⊂ N\{i} and j ∈ S. Thus, a harmless player is a player who never
produces negative externalities to others.
Given a game u ∈ PRIN , a player i ∈ N is called an immune-harmful player if it is
both an immune player and a harmful player in u; or is called an immune-harmless player
if it is both an immune player and a harmless player in u.
• Property 9 (The immune-harmless player property): fi(u) = u(i, {i}), for all u ∈
PRIN and for any immune-harmless player i in (N, u).
Proposition 5.6 The primeval rule satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry and the immune-
harmless player property.
Proof.
(i) Efficiency: Clearly, by construction, Bσ(u) is efficient for all σ ∈ Π(N).
(ii) Complete symmetry: Let i1, i2 be two completely symmetric players in u ∈ PRIN .
Consider σ ∈ Π(N), and without loss of generality, σ(k) = i1, σ(h) = i2, where i1, i2 ∈ N .
Let σ¯ ∈ Π(N) be the permutation which is obtained from σ by interchanging the positions
of i1 and i2, i.e.
σ¯(w) =

σ(w) if w 6= k, h
i1 if w = h
i2 if w = k.
As σ 7→ σ¯ is bijective, it suffices to prove that Bσi1(u) = Bσ¯i2(u).
Case 1: 1 < k < h.
By definition, we know
Bσi1(u) = B
σ
σ(k)(u) = u(σ(k), S
σ
k )− Lσσ(k)(u) +Gσσ(k)(u)
Bσ¯i2(u) = B
σ¯
σ¯(k)(u) = u(σ¯(k), S
σ¯
k )− Lσ¯σ¯(k)(u) +Gσ¯σ¯(k)(u).
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Obviously, u(σ(k), Sσk ) = u(σ¯(k), S
σ¯
k ). Moreover, since i1, i2 are completely symmetric
players, Lσσ(k)(u) = L
σ¯
σ¯(k)(u) and G
σ
σ(k)(u) = G
σ¯
σ¯(k)(u). Therefore, B
σ
i1
(u) = Bσ¯i2(u).
Case 2: 1 < h < k. The proof is analogous to the above.
Case 3: 1 = k < h. Apparently,
Bσi1(u) = u(σ(1), {σ(1)}) +Gσσ(1)(u) = u(σ¯(1), {σ¯(1)}) +Gσ¯σ¯(1)(u) = Bσ¯σ¯(1)(u) = Bσ¯i2(u).
Case 4: 1 = h < k. Analogously, the proof is easy to be established.
As a consequence, Bσi1(u) = B
σ¯
i2
(u).
(iii) The immune-harmless player property: Given a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , let i be
an immune-harmless player in game u. Then, by definition, one can readily check that
Lσi (u) = 0 and G
σ
i (u) = 0 for all σ ∈ Π(N). Hence, Bσi (u) = u(i, {i}) for all σ ∈ Π(N).
The following example shows that the primeval rule does not satisfy additivity.
Example 5.7 Consider the primeval game u3 which is obtained by adding the primeval
games u1 and u2 of Example 5.4 together.
S (a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
u¯3(S) (6) (4) (7) (10, 5) (5, 8) (4, 7) (9, 4, 8)
The primeval rule yields that ζ(u3) =
(
91
2
, 41
3
, 71
6
)
, which does not equal the sum of the
outcomes of the primeval rule for u1 and u2.
By investigating the gains of specific types of players under different compensation
rules, we can see the relationships and differences among those rules.
We first consider the following corollary which discusses the gains of an uninfluential
player according to the primeval rule and the marginalistic rule. The result is consistent
with our intuition: As an uninfluential player, he need not compensate the others while
he could benefit from the positive externalities from the others. So, for an uninfluential
player, the outcome of the primeval rule is always no less than that of the marginalistic
rule for a primeval game.
Corollary 5.8 For any game u ∈ PRIN and any uninfluential player i ∈ N , it holds that
ζi(u) ≥ Φi(u).
Proof. Given a game u ∈ PRIN , let i ∈ N be an uninfluential player. Given σ ∈ Π(N),
let i = σ(k). It suffices to show Bσi (u) ≥ mσi (u). This can be readily verified since
Bσi (u) = B
σ
σ(k)(u) =

u(i, {i}) +Gσσ(1)(u) if k = 1
u(i, Sσk ) +G
σ
σ(k)(u) if k ∈ {2, ..., |N | − 1}
u(i, N) if k = |N |
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and mσi (u) = m
σ
σ(k)(u) = u(i, S
σ
k ) for k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}.
We would like to note that there is no general relationship between the concession rule
and the other two rules with respect to uninfluential players.
For an immune-harmful player, since he cannot get any positive externalities but needs
to compensate the others as he always does harm to them, the outcome of the primeval
rule is equivalent to that of the marginalistic rule. An immune-harmless player may be
expected to obtain his R-C payoff: He need not compensate the others because he does
not do anything harmful. Meanwhile, he need not be compensated because nobody affects
him. The primeval rule is consistent with this idea while the marginalistic rule and the
concession rule may give extra payoff to such a player as they take a different perspective
such that the positive externalities are not for free.
Corollary 5.9 For any game u ∈ PRIN , we have
(a) Φi(u) = ζi(u) ≤ Ci(u) ≤ u(i, {i}) for any immune-harmful player i ∈ N ; and
(b) Φi(u) ≥ Ci(u) ≥ ζi(u) = u(i, {i}) for any immune-harmless player i ∈ N .
Proof.
(a) Given σ ∈ Π(N) and let i = σ(k) for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |}. First, in order to prove
Φi(u) = ζi(u), it suffices to show m
σ
i (u) = B
σ
i (u). Apparently, when k = 1, m
σ
i (u) =
Bσi (u) = u(i, {i}). When k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}, we get
mσi (u) =
k∑
l=1
u(σ(l), Sσk )−
k−1∑
j=1
u(σ(j), Sσk−1)
= u(i, Sσk ) +
k−1∑
j=1
u(σ(j), Sσk )−
k−1∑
j=1
u(σ(j), Sσk−1)
= u(i, Sσk )−
k−1∑
j=1
(
u(σ(j), Sσk−1)− u(σ(j), Sσk )
)
= Bσi (u).
Moreover, since
∑k−1
j=1
(
u(σ(j), Sσk−1)− u(σ(j), Sσk )
) ≥ 0, we know mσi (u) = Bσi (u) ≤
u(i, {i}) for all k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}. Then, Φi(u) = ζi(u) ≤ u(i, {i}). By Proposition 4.3,
we have
Cσi (u) =
1
2
u(i, N) +
1
2
Φi(u)
=
1
2
u(i, {i}) + 1
2
Φi(u)
≥ Φi(u).
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(b) By definition and analogous to part (a), the proof is easy to be established.
Corollary 5.10 For any game u ∈ PRIN and any harmless player i ∈ N with u(i, N) ≥
u(i, {i}), it holds that
ζi(u) ≥ u(i, {i}).
Proof. For a primeval game u ∈ PRIN , let i be a harmless player in u. For an ordering
σ ∈ Π(N), let i = σ(k), k ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. By definition and since u(i, N) ≥ u(i, {i}), we
know Gσi (u) ≥ 0 if k = 1; Lσi (u) = 0 for all k ∈ {2, ..., |N |}; and
u(i, Sσk ) +G
σ
i (u) ≥ u(i, N) ≥ u(i, {i})
for all k ∈ {2, ..., |N | − 1}. Hence, Bσi (u) ≥ u(i, {i}).
Note that Corollary 5.10 can be understood as the property of individual rationality
for harmless players: If a player’s presence never does harm to others and his status quo
payoff is greater than his R-C payoff, he should get at least his R-C payoff.
As the following example shows, the marginalistic rule and the concession rule do not
satisfy this property.
Example 5.11 Consider the following game u with three players, a, b and c.
S (a) (b) (c) (a, b) (a, c) (b, c) (a, b, c)
u¯(S) (3) (1) (5) (0, 1) (0, 5) (0, 6) (3, 1, 6)
Here a is a harmless player. According to the marginalistic rule, Φa(u) = 2
1
3
; and according
to the concession rule, Ca(u) = 223 . Both are less than a’s R-C payoff of 3. However, the
primeval rule yields that ζa(u) = 4.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we constructed a new class of games, primeval games, to model inter-
individual externalities and analyzed the associated compensation problem from a nor-
mative perspective. Three compensation rules, as the solution concepts for such games,
were introduced. Firstly, following the argument that any player should assume the full
responsibility of the externalities imposed by him or her, the marginalistic rule is defined.
Next, by taking a bilateral perspective on the consequences of externalities, we obtain the
concession rule. Characterizations of these two compensation rules are provided. More-
over, the paper introduces a more context-specific solution concept, the primeval rule,
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which seems more appropriate to smooth out the conflicts arising from externalities. Spe-
cial properties of this rule as well as the comparison with the other two rules with respect to
special classes of primeval games or specific types of players are studied. We unfortunately
have to acknowledge the lack of a full characterization of the primeval rule.
We want to note that the three compensation rules under consideration can also be
motivated from a non-cooperative perspective. Following the generalized bidding approach
proposed by Ju and Wettstein (2006), Ju and Borm (2006) designed bidding games and
implemented the compensation rules in subgame perfect equilibrium. Moreover, the model
of primeval games provides a new angle to study the issue of coalition formation. As
a first attempt, Funaki, Borm and Ju (2006) associated the analysis of stable coalition
structures with compensation problems in the context of primeval games. Finally, we like
to note that a detailed analysis of the issues of variable populations and related consistency
aspects within the primeval game framework is an interesting topic for future research.
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